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 1 
THE HIDDEN ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE HISTORY: 
REHABILITATING THE ‘AIRPORT BOOKSTALL’ 
 
In July 1984, Christopher Andrew and David Dilks published a modest-looking 
collection of essays called The Missing Dimension. In fact, this was nothing less than 
a manifesto, calling on academic historians to take intelligence history seriously and 
lamenting that this important subject was dominated by journalistic accounts and 
unreliable memoirs. Indeed, it derided this latter material as the ‘airport bookstall’ 
school of intelligence history.1 More than thirty years later, anyone taking the many 
intelligence courses currently available in leading universities will almost certainly be 
told that the academic study of their subject began in 1984. Since then, academic 
writing on intelligence has mushroomed, with numerous journals and books series. By 
contrast, books on intelligence from before this date are noticeably absent from both 
university libraries and intelligence module syllabi.2  
                                                        
This article was first given as a paper at 'Unwrapping National Security: A Workshop 
on Methods in Intelligence and Security Studies', Aberystwyth University, in October 
2014. The author gratefully acknowledges comments made there and also by other 
readers.  
1 The term originates with: C. Andrew, ‘Historical Research on the British 
Intelligence Community’, in R. Godson (ed.), Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The 
U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the Third World (Virginia, 1988). 
2 This argument is based on selecting five preeminent authors from this period – 
Chapman Pincher, Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Rebecca West, John Bulloch, Andrew 
Boyle and searching for them in King’s College, Brunel University and Warwick 
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 Donald Cameron Watt was perhaps the most censorious. Watt was an 
influential figure, holding the prestigious Stevenson Chair in International History at 
the LSE and winning the Wolfson Prize for his magisterial history of the outbreak of 
the Second World War, How War Came.3 Importantly, he was President of the UK 
Universities Study Group on Intelligence and was also one of the longest serving 
members of the editorial board of the journal, Intelligence and National Security. 
Watt collectively condemned what he called 'TV faction, journalism and the airport 
bookstall school of history with their interminable cries of "cover up"', insisting that 
these were all dubious historical forms where the author was lured in by the seduction 
of the inside story - 'the belief that there is always a secret behind the facade'.  He 
warned that in its extreme form 'this impulse leads to the conspiratorial school of 
historiography'.4   
 
 Intelligence history has been driven forward by three distinct, if overlapping, 
sets of writers: former practitioners and policy-makers, academics and journalists. As 
Gerry Hughes has reminded us, these can be jealous factions, with journalists seeking 
the intellectual respectability of academia and professors yearning after the financial 
                                                                                                                                                              
University libraries. I am indebted to Richard Aldrich, Philip Davies and Michael 
Goodman for sharing their undergraduate syllabi on intelligence. 
3 Like Christopher Andrew, he was appointed as an official historian. His subject was 
the organisation of British defence policy, 1945-64, but this volume has yet to appear.  
4 D. C. Watt, 'Critical Afterthoughts and Alternative Historico-Literary Theories', in 
Wesley K. Wark (ed.), Spy Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence (London, 1991), 
p.214. 
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rewards of trade publishing. Both these categories envy the insider information 
enjoyed by the practitioner or former minister. Former intelligence practitioners, such 
as Sir David Omand, have become professors. Specialist intelligence journalists, 
among whom we might number Paul Lashmar and Stephen Dorril, have also become 
professors. Cees Wiebes, the most eminent Dutch intelligence historian joined 
government to become its lead investigator at NCTB, the counter-terrorism fusion 
centre. Prominent American academics such as Bob Jervis and Richard Immerman 
have openly described their experiences working as contractors for the CIA. Perhaps 
only Lord Hennessy of Nymsfield can claim to have transversed all three categories. 
Happily, these categories are now demonstrably fluid, but as Watt’s acerbic 
comments make clear, in the 1980s they were not.5 
 
Accordingly, the literature from this earlier period has been largely exorcised 
from the historiography of British intelligence.6 As early as 1990, Donald Cameron 
Watt – looking back at works on intelligence from this period – attacked  ‘the sheer 
unhistoricism of most of the literature about national “secret services”, adding that 
                                                        
5 R.G. Hughes, ' Of Revelatory Histories and Hatchet Jobs: Propaganda and Method 
in Intelligence History', Intelligence and National Security, 23/6 (2008), pp.859-63. 
6 The ‘Dark Age’ of intelligence history might be said to lie between 1945 and 1984. 
The historiography of British intelligence is best understood in waves that overlay 
each another, as opposed to discrete discontinuous periods. This was preceded by the 
‘Spy Fiction’ era, roughly 1905-1960, see: C. R. Moran, ‘The pursuit of intelligence 
history: methods, sources, and trajectories in the United Kingdom’, Studies in 
Intelligence, 55/2 (2011); N. Hiley, ‘Decoding German spies: British spy fiction 
1908–18’, Intelligence and National Security, 5/4 (1990), pp.55-79. 
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this inhibited real historians from working in the field because of the fear of losing 
their professional reputations.’ 7  Watt’s observation explains why professional 
historians continue to deliberately ostracise earlier works of popular intelligence 
history, adding that their worries were ‘in part psychological, in part 
methodological.’ 8  The pejorative term ‘airport bookstall’ school is designed to 
distance popular writers, consigning them to oblivion amongst true crime and football 
biography.9 Yet despite the low opinion held by many intelligence scholars of the 
‘airport bookstall’ school of British intelligence history, the methodological issues 
that Watt alluded to remain as a constant and in fact, link us to, rather than distance us 
from, these earlier writings. 
 
Accordingly, the anxieties about this earlier literature stand in need of revision. 
Moreover, the literature from this period might be better designated the ‘Muckraker 
Era’, rather than the ‘airport bookstall’.10  First, I will suggest that the literature from 
this ostracised period can still provide a useful frame of reference and, triangulated 
                                                        
7 D. C. Watt, ‘Intelligence and the Historian: A Comment on John Gaddis's 
“Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins”’, Diplomatic History, 14/2 (1990), 
p.199. 
8 Ibid.  
9 C.f. fn. 20. Andrew, ‘Historical Research’. 
10 I use the term ‘muckraker’ here in the American sense, suggesting a journalist who 
investigates allegations of corruption among the government to perform an auditing or 
watchdog function, not in the British sense of a journalist specialising in salaciousness 
or scandal. See Louis Filler, The Muckrakers: New and Enlarged Edition of 
Crusaders for American Liberalism (Pennsylvania, 1976), pp.367–68.  
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with today’s scholarship, provide fascinating information. Second, the investigative 
techniques pioneered in the Muckraker Era – ‘archival hacking’, anonymous elite 
interviews and access to privileged information – still constitute the methodological 
backbone of historical research into intelligence, marking muckrakers out as pioneers 
not pariahs. These arguments are illustrated by focusing on the works of three authors 
– Rebecca West, Gordon Brook-Shepherd and John Bulloch – as emblematic authors 
of the Muckraker Era. Admittedly, there are other authors who could have been 
chosen: Chapman Pincher, Andrew Boyle or Anthony Cave-Brown, to name but a 
few. However, West, Brook-Shepherd and Bulloch have been selected because they 
constitute the leading non-fiction spy-writers of the era. Lastly, I will attempt to recast 
the literature from the Muckraker Era, offering a new and more constructive 
perspective, despite the epistemological shortcomings. Accepting the limitations of 
texts – like a contemporary historian of Rome accepts the limitations of the accounts 
of Tacitus or Polybius  – opens up new avenues of enquiry and new narratives.11  
 
The importance of embracing new narratives cannot be overstated. Currently, 
intelligence historians are over-dependent on declassified documents and official 
histories by the British government and this has created a close, even unhealthy, 
relationship. Intelligence historians need documents from the British government to 
write their histories; the government needs historians to retroactively validate past 
                                                        
11 On the parallels between intelligence history and historical research on ancient or 
medieval history see R.G. Hughes, 'Of Revelatory Histories and Hatchet Jobs’, p.844; 
P. Jackson, ‘Introduction: enquires into the secret state’ in R.G. Hughes, L. Scott and 
P. Jackson (eds.) Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State, 
(London, 2008), p.2. 
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actions to maintain the legitimacy of the current intelligence community. The upshot 
of this is a current academic sub-discipline of intelligence studies which, while 
embracing critical ideas in its ontology, has nevertheless suffered epistemological 
sabotage by the authorities and lacks any appetite for investigation, beyond buying a 
train ticket to the National Archives. Remarkably, dissatisfaction with this supine 
attitude has prompted academics in the cognate disciplines of sociology and 
communication theory to launch their own alternative field under the banner of 
‘surveillance studies’.   
 
 
THE RISE OF THE BRITISH MUCKRAKERS 
The first wave of intelligence writing that informed the British public about espionage 
was entirely fictional and was written in the first half of the twentieth century. The 
mythical British spy created by the pen of novel writers like William le Queux and 
John Buchan was real in the minds of a society besotted with a ‘sense of imperial 
frailty’. 12  Authors of spy fiction were nourished by a growing sense of national 
decline that toyed with the anxieties Edwardian society, eventually verging on 
paranoia by 1910. Often claiming to be “faction”, spy and invasion stories, if anything, 
belong to the literature of patriotism that portrayed the quintessential swashbuckling 
English gentleman in service of King and country in a secret war to hold back the 
looming tide of barbarism. This fictional depiction of the spy would dominate British 
public perceptions almost unchallenged up until the end of the Second World War 
                                                        
12 C. Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence 
Community (New York, 1985), p.34. 
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when, for the most part, fictional ‘spy-fever’ about mostly non-existent German 
agents was substituted by real life ‘mole mania’ focused on the KGB.13  
 
The pinnacle of ‘mole mania’ was perhaps the 1960s – a decade aptly 
described by Richard Aldrich as an era of ‘exposure’ – because of a series of real-life 
spy scandals.  This exposure began with a bang. Global events that no-one could hide 
–  such as the shooting down of the CIA’s U-2 spy-plane and the capture of its pilot 
Gary Powers, or the Bay of Pigs the following year – put espionage on the front page 
of every newspaper. This accelerated cultural change amongst journalists and 
reporters who had previously been respectful of secrecy were now asking questions.14 
The secret services themselves were caught up in this and became oddly self-
conscious about their own image, set against that of the enemy. Hitherto anxious to 
hide the very existence of secret services, now they used defectors to leak material to 
the press about their opponents in a race to damage each other’s reputation.15 This 
                                                        
13 Alongside a torrent of spy-fiction existed a second stream of literature that 
celebrated the new detective as a mixture of undercover operative and scientist, see H. 
Shpayer-Makov, The Ascent of the Detective: Police Sleuths in Victorian and 
Edwardian England (Oxford, 2011).  
14 R.J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence 
(London, 2001), pp.607-10. 
15 For example, K. Anders, Murder to Order (London, 1965) details the KGB 
liquidation of Ukrainian nationalist leaders L. Rebet and S. Bandera. See also Paul 
Maddrell, ‘What we have discovered about the Cold War is what we already knew: 
Julius Mader and the Western secret services during the Cold War,’ Cold War History 
5/2 (2005), pp. 235-258. 
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was a wonderful time to be a ‘muckraking’ investigative journalist exploring the 
burgeoning world of Cold War espionage. 
 
In Britain, the spy-world was also booming. 1961 saw the uncovering of the 
illegal KGB residents in the Portland Spy Ring, and later that year, former MI6 
employee George Blake was exposed as a Soviet spy. In 1963, the Profumo Affair, 
focused on the Secretary of State for War who engaged in an affair with a London call 
girl who, in turn was also in a relationship with a Soviet spy, Yevgeni Ivanov. The 
frenzied press coverage resulted in frequent references to MI5 in the newspapers. In 
1967, Chapman Pincher at the Daily Express revealed that the Government routinely 
intercepted thousands of private cables, setting in motion a chain of events that 
brought personal censure upon then-prime minister Harold Wilson and very nearly 
spelled the end for the D-Notice Committee, the joint government media body whose 
purpose was to prevent the public disclosure of information that would adversely 
affect ‘the defence of the realm’.16 A year later, Kim Philby, an MI6 traitor and the 
‘third man’ who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1963, published his KGB-
sponsored memoir, My Silent War, which remorselessly revealed the details of MI6 
personnel, operations and liaison relationships over thirty years.17 
 
The decade expedited a narrative critical of British intelligence that challenged 
conventional wisdom and pre-figured the new discipline of intelligence studies. 
Writers such as Chapman Pincher, Nigel West, Andrew Boyle, Philip Knightley, John 
Bulloch, Anthony Cave Brown, Douglas Sutherland, Clive Irving, Rebecca West and 
                                                        
16 Moran, ‘The pursuit’, p.36. 
17 See K. Philby, My Silent War (London, 1968). 
 9 
more wrote feverishly on Atomic Spies, the Ultra Secret, the Wilson Plot, the 
‘Cambridge Comintern’ and the purported duplicity of MI5’s former Director-General 
Sir Roger Hollis. These writers would provide the first nonfiction narrative on 
intelligence, set against a government that endeavoured to keep the archives closed 
and intelligence disclosures out of the public domain. Although they provided the 
‘first narrative’, British muckrakers embodied the spirit of revisionist history, as they 
sought to deconstruct the British secret service, its spies and the establishment more 
generally.  As such, ‘muckraker history’ is the most appropriate epithet for literature 
from this period as for the most part writers embraced a sense of counter-culture. 
They operated outside academia, mostly from Fleet Street, contested traditional views 
of events, and reinterpreted orthodox views on evidence, motivations and decision-
making processes surrounding intelligence. For the authors of this era, writing on 
intelligence was both a professional and political activity, designed – as Christopher 
Moran has pointed out – ‘to shake the establishment by shining a harsh and bright 
light on its unethical practices’.18  
 
To a certain extent, the criticisms of the British muckrakers are justified, as 
some of the writing from this period had a propensity towards rather sensationalist 
narratives.19 For example, Anthony Cave Brown’s notorious and erroneous assertion 
                                                        
18 Moran, ‘The pursuit’, p.34. 
19  Three very good examples of this are R. Deacon, A History of the British Secret 
Service (London, 1969); P. Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as 
Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist, and Whore (London, 1986); and W. Stevenson, A Man 
Called Intrepid (New York, 1976). None of these books have ‘aged’ particularly well 
and have been criticised for being replete with errors and a few fabrications.  
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that Churchill allowed the bombing of Coventry to go unopposed to protect the Ultra 
secret.20 Moreover, in the absence of evidence, some British muckrakers from this 
ostracised period violated what John Ferris aptly describes as the first rule for rabbit 
stew, ‘first, catch your rabbit,’ and its corollary, ‘if you haven’t caught a bunny, you 
can’t bake it’.21 On the other hand, some of the writing was good and showed the 
early signs of a developing discipline. So why has the era been viewed as a ‘Dark 
Age’; a period of British intelligence that young scholars are forewarned to engage 
with at their own peril? The answers can be found in one of intelligence history’s 
most cited books, Andrew and Dilks’ Missing Dimension – the edited volume that 
served as a manifesto for proper historians to investigate secret things – and which 
has served as the historiographical ‘big bang’ for intelligence studies.22  
 
 
OFFICIAL ORIGINS 
Missing Dimension had many targets. It criticised mainstream historians of diplomacy 
and military operations for ignoring intelligence, it criticised the ‘airport bookstall’ 
                                                        
20 A.C. Brown, Bodyguard of Lies: The Vital Role of Deception Strategy in World 
War II, (London, 1976), pp.32-45. 
21 J. Ferris, ‘Coming in from the Cold War: The historiography of American 
intelligence, 1945-1990’, Diplomatic History, 19/1 (1995), p.93. The Ferris quote is 
third hand from Winston Churchill, which in turn is from Mrs. Glass's recipe for 
Jugged Hare: ‘First catch your hare’. See: T. Ben-Moshe, Churchill: Strategy and 
History (Boulder, Col, 1992), pp.236–37. 
22 C. M. Andrew and D. Dilks, The Missing Dimension: Government and Intelligence 
Communities in the Twentieth Century (London, 1984). 
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for not doing it properly, and it criticised government for not releasing more records. 
Yet oddly, the ground for Missing Dimension and its ideas was prepared by several 
official histories of British secret service success during the Second World War, and 
the first in a fleet of official histories on the same subject, edited by Harry Hinsley.23 
Challenged by insiders who wanted to set the record straight,24 the Cabinet Secretary, 
Sir Burke Trend, pressed for the release of Ultra records to scholars, arguing this was 
better than the field being dominated by journalists and defectors like Philby. 
Hinsley’s magnum opus would go on to become the blueprint of ‘good scholarship’ 
for future generations of intelligence historians.25  
 
The ostracisation of the muckraker literature, however, did not take place in 
earnest until 1984 with the publication of The Missing Dimension, co-edited by one of 
Hinsley’s former tutees, Christopher Andrew.  In the introduction to the edited 
volume, Andrew surveyed the published work on intelligence and noted that 
                                                        
23 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 1: Its Influence 
on Strategy and Operations (London, 1979); M.R.D. Foot, SOE in France, An 
Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France 1940–
1944 (London, 1966). 
24 F. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (London, 1974); J. C. Masterman, The Double 
Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven, 1972). 
25 C.J. Murphy, ‘The origins of SOE in France,’ The Historical Journal, 46/4 (2003), 
pp. 935-952; R.J. Aldrich, ‘Policing the past: official history, secrecy and British 
intelligence since 1945’, The English Historical Review, 119/483 (2004), pp. 922-953. 
See more recently, I. Cobain, The History Thieves: Secrets, Lies and the Shaping of a 
Modern Nation, (London, 2016). 
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academic historians had tended to either ‘ignore intelligence altogether, or to treat it 
as of little importance’, and that the ‘yawning gaps in the history of British 
intelligence’ to some extent had been filled by ‘adventurous non-academics’.26 By 
1988, as a contributor to another edited volume on intelligence, Andrew would give 
the literature of ‘adventurous non-academic’ writing on intelligence a name: the 
‘airport bookstall’ genre.27  The label stuck, and since then has come to describe 
almost all books, except the above official histories, written during the Muckraker 
Era.28  
Andrew was unquestionably the academic pioneer. No university historian had 
written more scholarly articles on intelligence in the previous decade. 29  Yet for 
                                                        
26 Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension, pp.1-2. 
27 See Andrew, ‘Historical Research’. 
28 The following Book and articles have used or applied the label ‘airport bookstall’: 
Moran, ‘The pursuit’, p.36; R.J. Aldrich, Espionage, Security, and Intelligence in 
Britain, 1945-1970 (Manchester, 1998); R.J. Aldrich, ‘Persuasion? British 
Intelligence, the History Policeman and Official Information’, in C. R. Moran and P. 
Major (eds), Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence since 1945 (Newcastle upon 
Tyne, 2010); C.J. Murphy, ‘Spooked: Britain, empire and intelligence since 1945’, 
The International History Review, 36/2 (2014), p.373; P. Hennessy, ‘The less secret 
state’, History Today, 62/10 (October 2012);  M. Hindley, ‘First annual list of 
dissertations on intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 13/4 (1998), p.208; 
D. C. Watt, ‘Intelligence and the historian: A comment on John Gaddis's “intelligence, 
espionage, and Cold War origins”’, Diplomatic History, 14/2 (1990), p.204. 
29  See for example: ‘Déchiffrement et diplomatie: Le cabinet noir sous la troisième 
république,’ Relations Internationals, 5 (Spring 1976), pp. 37-64; ‘The British Secret 
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Andrew to establish this narrative, with intelligence as ‘the missing dimension of 
most diplomatic history’, it was necessary to marginalise all works of intelligence that 
had come before, and the term ‘airport bookstall’ embodied this particular framing.30 
Logically, Andrew and Dilks’ argument about a ‘missing dimension’ was true insofar 
as most scholars of diplomatic and military history had ignored the subject, but in 
saying this they were merely moving in step with Trend’s decision to accelerate 
official history and intelligence declassification. A more cogent observation would 
have been the extent to which the larger official history programme prior to 1979 had 
actively airbrushed intelligence from the public record. 
 
Andrew’s more acerbic critique of the ‘airport bookstall’ is less plausible. It 
depends on a charge of ‘absurdity’ levelled against many best-selling publications on 
                                                                                                                                                              
Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920s. Part I: From the Trade Negotiations 
to the Zinoviev Letter’, The Historical Journal, 20 (1977), pp. 673-706; ‘Whitehall, 
Washington and the Intelligence Services,’ International Affairs, 53 (1977), pp. 390-
404; ‘The Mobilization of British Intelligence in the Two World Wars,’ in N.F. 
Dreiszinger (ed.) Mobilization for Total War: The Canadian, American and British 
Experience 1914-1918, 1939-1945, (Waterloo, 1981), pp. 87-101. 
30 The phrase ‘missing dimension’ originates from Sir Alexander Cadogan. See D. 
Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M. 1938-1945 (London, 1917), 
p.21. Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension, p.1. While not an official historian, 
David Dilks had served as the lead researcher for the vast Eden and Macmillan 
memoirs, enjoyed unparalleled access and so had glimpsed the missing dimension 
himself.    
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intelligence.31 But it links back to the missing dimension thesis, since Watt argued 
that in part, historians had seldom engaged with literature from the Muckraker Era 
because of the reputational issue, a ‘psychological’ barrier in front of historians that 
was no less formidable than the methodological barrier.   
 
University historians may have been snooty about trade publications. However, 
the ‘absurdity’ charge about many best-selling publications on intelligence was 
misplaced. The merit of a text should be evaluated on an individual basis, regardless 
of the period it was written or the nature of the outlet. Moreover, when one compares 
some of these early works to academic work being produced today, what becomes 
abundantly clear is that the problems of gaps in the archives and the difficulty 
evaluating insider information have changed little. In short, the epistemological 
shortcomings that have confined the works of British muckrakers to a ghetto-like 
existence for the past three decades are in fact universal.  
 
Three decades on from The Missing Dimension, many a scholar has answered 
Andrew’s clarion call.32 Most of these historians use variants of three techniques 
pioneered by the muckrakers. (1) To become increasingly skilled at an approach 
Richard Aldrich has termed ‘archival intelligence hacking’ combing private papers 
and  ‘adjacent’ records to fill in ‘both the general outline of the missing intelligence 
                                                        
31 Ibid. 
32 See especially the special issue edited by Oliver Hoare, ‘British Intelligence in the 
Twentieth Century: A Missing Dimension?’, Intelligence and National Security, 17/1 
(2002). 
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dimension and much of its operational detail’. 33 (2) To follow the advice of Philip 
Davies, and substitute elite interviews for official documents.34 Or (3) as Christopher 
Moran notes, to rely on ‘inside information obtained from well-connected friends in 
Whitehall’.35 The above three were the methodology of the “muckraker”, and are still 
largely the essence of today’s intelligence historian. 
 
Methodological continuity is thus at the core of any attempt to rehabilitate the 
‘airport bookstall’. Three authors – Rebecca West, Gordon Brook-Shepherd and John 
Bulloch, illustrate this well. 36  Together, these three authors demonstrate how the 
methodology from the Muckraker Era has not fundamentally changed for those 
writing on contemporary intelligence issues in the twenty-first century. The 
                                                        
33 Moran, ‘The pursuit’, p.39; Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension, p.4; and 
R.J. Aldrich, ‘The Secret State’, in P. Addison and H. Jones (eds.) A Companion to 
Contemporary Britain (Oxford, 2005), p.336. 
34 P.H.J. Davies, ‘Spies as informants: Triangulation and the interpretation of elite 
interview data in the study of the intelligence and security services’, Politics, 21/1 
(2001), p.74. 
35 Moran, ‘The pursuit’, p.36. 
36 These books are: R. West, The Meaning of Treason (New York, 1949); R. West, 
The New Meaning of Treason (New York, 1964); G. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm 
Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors (London, 1988); G. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm 
Petrels: The Flight of the First Soviet Defectors 1928-1938 (London, 1977); J. 
Bulloch, Akin to Treason (London, 1966); J. Bulloch, M.I.5: The Origin and History 
of the British Counter-Espionage Service (London, 1963); J. Bulloch and H. Miller, 
Spy Ring: The Full Story of the Naval Secrets Case (London, 1961). 
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contributions of the three authors also highlight that the information generated from 
this period should also not be ostracised, as they still have contributions to make. 
These books are by no means the only examples of texts from this ostracised period 
which warrant rehabilitation, however they are exemplars that delineate broader 
trends from the Muckraker Era.  
 
REBECCA WEST 
Rebecca West is a particularly alluring example of an early pioneer of the Muckraker 
Era as she has been heralded as one of the most important writers of the twentieth 
century.37 However, her contribution to the field has almost been entirely overlooked 
by intelligence historians – despite being the first to identify the subject that would be 
in ascendency for nearly four decades: the nature of treason.38 Undoubtedly there 
were individuals better suited than West to write about the techniques, stratagems and 
organisational structures of Nazi, and later Soviet, espionage operations. Nevertheless, 
she did conceptualise treason and ideological betrayal in a sophisticated way. West, at 
this notably early stage, showed the intellectual wherewithal to analyse an issue that 
many other historians at the time considered inconsequential.   
 
West ought to be considered the mother of intelligence history. She was the 
first to isolate a theme that would dominate much intelligence writing for the next half 
century: the study of traitors, moles and ideological betrayal. West began with a study 
                                                        
37 T. Martin, ‘The alphabet library: M is for the meaning of treason, “simply superb 
storytelling”’ The Telegraph, 20 May 2014. See also L. Gibb, West’s World: The 
Extraordinary Life of Dame Rebecca West (London, 2013). 
38 West, The Meaning; West, The New Meaning. 
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of John Amery, the pro-Nazi son of one of Churchill’s cabinet ministers and brother 
of Julian Amery, who served in the government of Margaret Thatcher. The idea of 
ideological betrayal transfixed the bureaucracies of East and West in the early post-
war period, exemplified by the Stalinist purges in eastern Europe during the 1950s 
and McCarthyite purges in America. Frantic searches in Whitehall for KGB moles 
found their ultimate expression in Chapman Pincher’s Their Trade is Treachery, 
published in 1980, making the unsettling claim that former-MI5 director, Sir Roger 
Hollis, was a Soviet traitor. 39  West was thus a pioneer of serious non-fiction 
intelligence writing. 
 
Her first book, The Meaning of Treason, was originally conceived as a 
magazine assignment. 40  In 1945 Harold Ross, the New Yorker's founding editor, 
commissioned West to report on the trials of William Joyce, better known as “Lord 
Haw Haw”, and John Amery – two British fascists who left for Europe in the 1930s 
and served Nazi Germany as radio propagandists. Both were sentenced to death by 
hanging in 1945. After sitting through the court proceedings at the blitz-damaged Old 
Bailey, West realised she had more material than would satisfy a column in The New 
Yorker, and embarked upon a wider study of trials and treason. The first edition of 
The Meaning of Treason appeared in 1949. West was particularly interested in the 
betrayals of Joyce and Amery, which she saw as ‘that sin which travesties legitimate 
hatred because it is felt for kindred, as incest is the travesty of legitimate love’.41 She 
argued that Nazi intelligence operatives attempted by any means – be it coercion, 
                                                        
39 See C. Pincher, Their Trade Is Treachery (London, 1981). 
40 R. West (ed. B.K. Scott), Selected Letters of Rebecca West (New Haven, 2000). 
41 West, The New Meaning, p.3. 
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seduction or bribery – to induce treachery. It was published to wide acclaim and Time 
magazine featured the author on its cover with the tagline: ‘In the 20th century, 
treason is a vocation’.42 The book was praised in reviews in equal measures for its 
clarity, its trailblazing and, of course, West’s famed ability to weave a narrative into 
‘superb storytelling’.43  
 
West’s methodological approach to the writing of Treason is to be 
commended. Unlike many other British muckrakers and current intelligence 
historians, she worked for the most part from open sources, court proceedings and 
more mundane records. From these files, West was able to provide a profound insight 
and a ground-breaking analysis on the psychology of betrayal. This is the epitome of 
Aldrich’s ‘archival intelligence hacking’. The core files held by MI5 and Scotland 
Yard on William Joyce and John Amery were not available for popular consumption 
at the time of West’s writing. Undeterred, working with only court documents – her 
adjacent files – she provided not only a foundational text on betrayal but also a 
pioneering work of what we now call psycho-history. 44  
 
                                                        
42 Time Magazine, 8 December 1947, with Author Rebecca West on the cover, at: 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19471208,00.html 
43 Martin, ‘The Alphabet’. 
44 Bernard Schweizer (ed.), Rebecca West Today: Contemporary Critical Approaches 
(Newark, 2006); Effie Yiannopoulou, ‘Globality, the Totalitarian Mass and National 
Belonging’, in Ruth Parkin-Gounelas (ed.), The Psychology and Politics of the 
Collective: Groups, Crowds and Mass (London, 2012), pp.122-34. 
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The Meaning of Treason gave only limited attention to British nationals who 
in the post-war era were exposed as spying for the Soviet Union. 45  West would 
correct this in the second edition of The Meaning of Treason entitled The New 
Meaning of Treason, published in 1964 – at the height of the Muckraker Era. In the 
years following the first edition, West came to feel that Joyce and Amery’s trial and 
execution had merely been ‘the death agony of the amateur in a specialized age’.46 
West argued that a new breed of traitor, driven by ideology rather than a thirst for 
prestige and power, would dominate the Cold War era. In The New Meaning of 
Treason, West offered psychological profiles from the new age of treachery, covering 
the activities of the atomic spies Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs and the Rosenbergs, 
the defections of both Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean and the Profumo Affair. Her 
epilogue also dealt with the emerging accusations against Kim Philby, who would 
soon flee to the Soviet Union.47 Railing against government secrecy, in her second 
book, West would not just use court documents from the Old Bailey but from US 
courts too. Noticing that lengthy reports had been issued by the governments of the 
US, Canada and Australia, she was perhaps the first British writer on intelligence to 
exploit more liberal information regimes across the Atlantic.48  
                                                        
45 H. Kalven Jr., ‘The Meaning of Treason by Rebecca West Reviewed’, The 
University of Chicago Law Review, 16/2 (Winter, 1949), p.378.  
46 West, The New Meaning, p.266.  
47 A third edition (1982), published by Virago, contained more information on the 
Cambridge spies, specifically Anthony Blunt, avowed by Thatcher’s government two 
years before. 
48 West, The New Meaning, forward –  The Report of the Royal Commission 
appointed by the Canadian Government to Investigate the Atom Spy Ring (1945), the 
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In 1965, Foreign Affairs described The New Meaning of Treason as one of 
‘the most provocative and probing discussion(s) of the implications of treason in an 
age of mass culture and technological explosion’.49 However, her book had its critics. 
Perhaps one of the main criticisms of The New Meaning of Treason was one of West's 
hypotheses: that Soviet espionage deliberately set out to undermine the trust of the 
Americans in the entire British security system to prevent co-operation between the 
two countries. It seemed implausible to many readers and reviewers at the time.50 
However, with the Cold War behind us we now know that sowing distrust between 
the allies was a central KGB strategy. It is therefore all the more curious that West’s 
pioneering work has gone unacknowledged and uncredited in the historiography of 
British intelligence history.51 
 
GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD 
                                                                                                                                                              
United States Government publication, Soviet Atomic Espionage (1951) and the 
Report of the Royal Commission appointed by the Australian Government to 
investigate matters arising out of the defection of the Soviet diplomat Petrov (1955). 
49 H.L. Roberts, ‘Recent books on international relations general: political and legal’, 
Foreign Affairs, 43/3 (April 1965), pp.536–539. 
50 See S. Hook, ‘Faces of betrayers’, The New York Times, 29 November 1964. 
51 Her other books, contain further neglected work on intelligence history, including 
the first extensive discussion of the case of William Marshall, an SIS/diplomatic 
cypher clerk recruited by the KGB and tried in the 1950s. See, R. West, A Train of 
Powder (London, 1955).   
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One of perhaps the most unsung writers from this ostracised period of intelligence 
literature is Gordon Brook-Shepherd. As a journalist who dealt with intelligence like 
many other British muckrakers, Brook-Shepherd has been tarred with the same 
unscholarly brush. Akin to Rebecca West, his two books on intelligence, The Storm 
Petrels and The Storm Birds are interconnected, dealing with the same subject matter 
– defectors – although separated from one another by sequential chronology.52 Also 
like West, Brook-Shepherd was a journalist who turned his talents to writing about 
British espionage. However, unlike West – and many muckrakers of the day – Brook-
Shepherd had a first-hand understanding of espionage. During the Second World War, 
he had worked in British military intelligence.53 Being a former intelligence officer 
was important to Brook-Shepherd’s writing of both Storm Petrels and Storm Birds for 
two reasons. First, because it meant that he had valuable contacts from the war in the 
world of intelligence that he would carry with him into the world of journalism. 54 
Second, Brook-Shepherd spoke the shibboleth – he was the consummate insider. For 
intelligence officers, speaking to Brook-Shepherd about the inner workings of 
Britain’s secret intelligence machinery simply felt less adulterous than speaking to a 
mere news correspondent.  
                                                        
52 Within the text I refer to these two texts as ‘Storm Birds’ and ‘Storm Petrels’ 
respectively.  
53 ‘Obituary of Gordon Brook-Shepherd’, The Daily Telegraph, 30 January 2004. 
54 The blurb on Brook-Shepherd in The Iron Maze notes that he worked in military 
intelligence, ending up a Lieutenant-Colonel with the Allied Commission in Vienna. 
See G. Brook-Shepherd, Iron Maze: The Western Secret Services and the Bolsheviks 
(Basingstoke, 1998).  
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Storm Petrels, the first of Brook-Shepherd’s books on Soviet defectors was 
released in 1977. It is truly a valuable work as precious little has been written about 
Soviet defectors and Soviet espionage in the pre-Second World War period. 55 Even 
today, it is still one of a notably short list of titles. In Storm Petrels Brook-Shepherd 
used the same literary tool as West, finding paradigmatic personal cases that 
delineated the contours of a wider phenomenon. This multi-biographical approach 
was common among British muckrakers and remains influential among academic 
intelligence historians today. In fact, this practice was so commonplace among early 
intelligence historians that D.C. Watt would later note this practice as being a 
hallmark of the ‘British intelligence history school.’56 Brook-Shepherd was interested 
in pre-war Soviet defection and told this story primarily through five figures: Boris 
Bazhanov, Georges Agabekov, Grigory Besedovsky, Walter Krivitsky and Aleksandr 
Orlov. Each had written their own books, but Storm Petrels is the only study to weave 
them into a singular narrative and to offer a comparative analysis.57 The importance 
of Brook-Shepherd’s single narrative cannot be overstated, and it was a vital 
                                                        
55 V. Krasnov, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List (Stanford, 1985), p.11.  
56 See D.C. Watt, ‘Intelligence studies: The emergence of a British school’, 
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methodological device at this early juncture. One individual – a defector – recounting 
the events of his own defection can certainly, justifiably, be accused of providing 
apocryphal details of events and circumstances. After all, defections from the Soviet 
Union to the West deal with tergiversators, men who in their own narratives will seek 
to justify their decision to defect and bolster their claims on behalf of their new host 
country.  
Storm Petrels was not just based on previous writing, but also on well-placed 
sources and debriefings of Soviet moles, such as Walter Krivitsky by SIS in 1940.58 
As a trusted journalist who had worked in British intelligence, doors opened for 
Brook-Shepherd. He also had unprecedented access to official files that detailed 
Soviet espionage operations.59 Additionally, he was granted extensive interviews with 
the defectors and the intelligence personnel related to their cases.60 In other words, 
Brook-Shepherd was able to triangulate his work – which Phillip Davies aptly 
illustrates in Spies as Informants is an important benchmark for the methodological 
rigour of any piece of writing on intelligence.61 Brook-Shepherd, commenting on his 
own work said he, ‘was able to fill most of the gaps’ left by previous writers by using 
a combination of written records, interviews and memoirs.62 In retrospect, his work 
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prefigures the SIS-approved work undertaken by Christopher Andrew on the KGB, 
working first with Oleg Gordievsky and then Vasili Mitrohkin.63 
 
Brook-Shepherd’s first book was not met with the same lofty praise as West’s 
The Meaning of Treason, receiving a generally tepid response. The major criticism 
was the book’s tone. He was criticised for providing a sensationalised account that 
‘wasn’t essential’ and was considered ‘not quite-fiction’. 64  Another commentator 
noted that at times it reads like ‘novels of spy fiction'.65 The criticism is not wholly 
unfair. It must be noted that the book is missing a bibliography and is poorly 
footnoted. This reflects the fact that Brook-Shepherd worked largely from 
‘unattributed’ or ‘un-attributable’ sources, which obviously creates some problems of 
historical reliability – as you have to accept or reject the word of the author. Again, in 
this respect he appears as a “storm-petrel” for the official histories that would begin to 
appear only a few years later and which often attracted similar criticism for opaque 
referencing.  
 
Brook-Shepherd, and other muckrakers, is thus no different to current 
intelligence writing in this important respect. Even now, few former or current 
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intelligence officers will consent to being ‘on the record’ and so the use of the ‘private 
information’ footnote from data gleaned from elite interviews has not changed.66 The 
diminished use of the ‘private information footnote’ or its use alongside other types of 
sources reflects an era of ‘open government’. Since the Waldegrave ‘Open 
Government’ Initiative in the 1990s many more documents have been released and 
press archives have become word-searchable.67  More narrowly, writers also benefit 
from an active research community that contributes to an ever-expanding selection of 
strong secondary sources. 68  Nevertheless, anonymous elite interviews persist. 
Andrew’s 2009 Authorized History of MI5 –  like Gordon Corera’s MI6, Life and 
Death in the British Secret Service and Philip Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of 
Spying –  is punctuated with anonymous elite interviews. In his notes, Corera relies on 
the traditional ‘private information’ footnote, Davies provides his own coding system 
for maintaining the anonymity of his interview subjects, whilst Andrew prefers to use 
the phrase ‘recollections of a former security officer’.69  
When Andrew was selected for MI5’s ‘Authorized History’ – which gave him 
unprecedented access to MI5’s official archives, as well as to former and serving 
security officers – his response to the difficulty of evaluating insider information was 
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the following: ‘Posterity and postgraduates are breathing down my neck. I tell my 
PhD students: I know you can only get on in the profession by assaulting teachers. 
You are not going to make a reputation by saying, ‘Look, Professor Andrew was right 
all along the line’.70 His argument has much force and has been widely accepted by 
commentators’.71 Andrew’s attitude is most likely correct, but Brook-Shepherd – and 
every other muckraker who ever conducted an elite interview or had privileged access 
to files – could use exactly the same argument. 72  No writer with a sense of 
professional integrity would knowingly publish something they knew to be false. 
Moreover, arguing that journalists somehow have less integrity when it comes to their 
work is tantamount to intellectual snobbery. Perhaps the main difference between the 
two official historians and Brook-Shepherd was the openly acknowledged nature of 
the relationship between the writer and the secret services that now exists. More 
recent books, including Michael Smith’s study of Foley, conducted with clear 
assistance from SIS, also falls into this strange category of officially-assisted but 
unofficial history.73   
 
Academic rigour will often jostle with research ethics or national security 
concerns. Insider information is not going to go away, neither are special friends. Yet 
ethical research frameworks have become much stronger in recent decades and with 
these, the imperative to anonymise or else seek elaborate written permissions. Thus, 
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Andrew’s comments in The Missing Dimension – which pertains to the difficulty of 
evaluating insider information – remain pertinent. Nevertheless, we can overcome this 
problem eventually, often with further triangulation utilising new files, which at the 
time of writing were not accessible, and with contemporary secondary source 
literature. In terms of Storm Petrels, the Guy Liddell Diaries edited by Nigel West are 
particularly useful, as are the Haunted Wood and A Time for Spies which bring 
forward new Soviet material.74 Yet strangely, some of the official papers used by 
Brook-Shepherd’s Storm Petrels are mysteriously no longer available to researchers.75 
Does this mean that over time some secondary texts from the Muckraker era will 
become valuable sources in themselves? 
 
Brook-Shepherd’s next offering successfully built upon Storm Petrels. The 
1988 Storm Birds dealt with four major post war defections: Igor Gouzenko, Oleg 
Penkovsky, Vladimir Vetrov and Oleg Gordievsky. 76 The reception of Storm Birds 
was almost universally positive.77  Among the positivity, however, a common theme 
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was a sense of something missing from the narrative – that of western intelligence and 
its reception, indeed encouragement of these defectors. In her opening of The New 
Meaning of Treason, West acknowledged that the subject she wanted to deal with 
crossed over many disciplines, which meant she was ‘obliged to leave unanswered 
many questions which will occur to the reader.’78 Her Majesty’s Government remains 
one of the most secretive in the West, and the notorious section 3(4) of the Public 
Records Act, which permits the retention of official documents indefinitely, greatly 
effects intelligence history.79  
 
No area of government is shrouded in secrecy more than a state’s intelligence 
community; the UK is no exception. Undoubtedly, secrecy is important and 
defensible on the grounds of operational and national security, and many intelligence 
historians have made this point. 80  On the other hand, the traditional British 
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governmental attitude, articulated here by Kenneth  Robertson, is best exemplified by 
the view that ‘the only realistic choice facing an intelligence service is between total 
secrecy, the suit of armor, and the fig leaf, anything short of total secrecy.’81 This 
absolutist assessment, which was adhered to by the majority of British governments in 
the twentieth century, is the principal reason that serious inquiries into intelligence 
were conducted almost solely by journalists – and in the twenty-first century official 
and authorised histories were launched, to stem the tide. 
 
Storm Birds, like almost all books that involve co-operation with the 
authorities, contain their own deliberative omissions, even deceptions.82 Storm Birds, 
like Storm Petrels, also received significant help from both the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the British intelligence services, in terms of elite interviews and access to 
archives.83 The price was a one-dimensional focus on the defectors and their past 
services and no contextual detail about their engagement with the Western services. 
Brook-Shepherd would himself acknowledge this assistance in his 1998 ‘The Iron 
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Maze: the Western Secret Services and the Bolsheviks’ noting that his previous two 
volumes ‘on Soviet defectors to the West’ were projects ‘also launched on my behalf 
by British intelligence.' 84  Yet the contribution is still overwhelmingly positive, 
illustrated by the case of GRU officer Vladimir Rezun, who defected to the British in 
Switzerland in 1978. Rezun’s information is a good example of the kind of credible 
information that Storm Birds contains and that is available nowhere else. Rezun 
brought information about the Red Army’s Spetsnaz units to the British in his 
debrief.85 The information obtained indicated that these units were tasked to employ 
sabotage, terror and other extreme actions in the event of war.86 British intelligence 
allowed Brook-Shepherd to interview Rezun, following the example of the CIA that 
had also made several of their defectors available to him.87 This sort of access was in 
itself a superb achievement. Yet, searches for Gordon Brook-Shepherd’s name on the 
two main intelligence journals in the US and UK yield only a few results from the 
same authors, and often with criticisms. Searching for him within university library 
catalogues you will find only his books on the Hapsburg Dynasty. Like Rebecca West, 
                                                        
84 Brook-Shepherd, Iron Maze, p.2. Nigel West has also claimed that ‘Brook-
Shepherd, who had prevailed upon his friendship with then Foreign Secretary 
Douglas Hurd, to let him see individual files while he was researching The Storm 
Birds’. See, N. West, ‘Slightly less secret’, International Journal of Intelligence and 
CounterIntelligence, 24/4 (2011), p.811. 
85 See Brook-Shepherd, Storm Birds.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid. Brook-Shepherd was also able to interview Gordievsky for Storm Birds. See C. 
Pincher, Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders and Cover-ups: Six Decades of Espionage 
(London, 2011), p.33. 
 31 
Brook-Shepherd has been largely ostracised from the historiography of British 
intelligence.  
 
 
JOHN BULLOCH 
The last writer we revisit is John Bulloch, perhaps the quintessential British 
intelligence muckraker. He is better known, however, for his writings on the Middle 
East than for his three intelligence books during the ‘era of exposure’ – the 1960s. 
Bulloch joined the Telegraph in 1958 and quickly cultivated fruitful intelligence 
connections. In 1961, with his Telegraph colleague Henry Miller, Bulloch’s first 
project in the world of intelligence was the co-written Spy Ring, addressing the 
Portland naval spies. Two years after the publication of Spy Ring, M.I.5: The Origins 
and History of the British Counter-Espionage Service, perhaps Bulloch’s magnum 
opus, was released to much fanfare. Three years later, his last – and often forgotten 
text – Akin to Treason was available on all good ‘airport bookstalls’. In Akin to 
Treason Bulloch came close to providing almost a complete survey of all Soviet spies 
in Britain up to the year of its publication, 1966.88 Nevertheless, despite being one of 
the most important journalists to cover espionage in the 1960s, his writing and 
contribution to the historiography of British intelligence has become a footnote to his 
career and the contribution he made to analysing the contemporaneous upheavals in 
the Middle East.89  
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Bulloch, like West and Brook-Shepherd, was an enterprising journalist who 
had combined the ability to tease out a story where others had presumed a trail had 
gone cold, with a talent for sustained and thoughtful analysis. Remarkably, Bulloch 
embarked upon writing the history of MI5 when the official records were out of 
bounds. Instead, he secured the assistance of the family of the late Sir Vernon Kell, 
who had been the Director-General of MI5 for its first three decades. He was able to 
speak with Kell’s wife and son and was the first individual to sieve through Kell’s 
private papers at the Imperial War Museum, uncovering new information on the 
Blake, Lonsdale and Vassal cases. This is an early archetypal case of Aldrich’s 
‘archival intelligence hacking’. The Official Secret Act cordoned off interviews with 
current and former Security Service employees, yet Bulloch completed his history of 
MI5 and did so without venturing too far away ‘from the path of documented fact’.90 
Kell’s private papers were the ‘adjacent’ papers to the official records locked away in 
Thames House and so Bulloch was able to generate a cogent history of MI5. Bulloch, 
and other muckrakers, also showed that mundane files released into the archives often 
contained hidden gems and that those government officials charged with ‘weeding’ 
them out often did not do as good a job as a determined muckraker. In this respect, he 
pioneered a technique that academic historians such as Christopher Andrew, David 
Stafford, Bradley Smith and Julian Lewis would rediscover in the late 1970s.91 
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Two decades later, David Stafford and Bradley Smith would use this 
technique to write their well-received histories of SOE and OSS.92 Four decades later, 
Richard Aldrich would employ the same artisanal technique, learned patiently from 
his predecessors, to write his unofficial history of GCHQ.93 All of these scholars used 
adjacent files and private papers. Also, like Bulloch, Stafford, Smith and Aldrich 
would miss important programs and chapters of the organisation’s history. This, 
however, by no means detracts from the ingenuity and knowledge generated by the 
research. Despite Bulloch’s methodological ingenuity to cover an organisation 
shrouded in mystery – that would be emulated by many academic intelligence 
historians for generations to come – M.I.5 was not well received by historians at the 
time. Instead it was criticised for its lack of rigour, and has subsequently been 
expunged from the intelligence studies literature.94  
 
M.I.5’s reception within government circles better reflects the value and depth 
of the research. Just two weeks before the book was published it was returned by 
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Colonel L.G. Lohan, the then D-notice secretary, with a mass of blue-pencilled 
deletions that he insisted were necessary.95 When the publisher – Arthur Baker – 
balked at the edits, the publisher’s solicitors received an urgent message that the then 
Home Secretary, Henry Brooke, needed to see the publisher immediately. The next 
day the Home Secretary warned that the publication of M.I.5 would be a very serious 
breach of the Official Secrets Act. In the meeting, a man referred to as Mr. Roger – 
who was in all likelihood Sir Roger Hollis, the then-Director-General of MI5 –  
admitted that the book did not breach the Act, but argued that the book would be 
against ‘the public interest’.96 The Home Secretary and Hollis then insisted upon edits 
and changes to a number of pages, which the publisher and Bulloch reluctantly agreed 
to.97 For a book that academics criticised for its lack of thoroughness, the government 
of the day went to quite some lengths to redact it.  
 
M.I.5 received its finest review from the Director-General himself. On the day 
the book was released, Hollis informed the Cabinet Office that the book gave a 
‘reasonably clear picture of the work and methods of the Security Service, and its 
relationship with the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police.’98 Despite the book 
containing many inaccuracies, Hollis was in no doubt it would give the KGB and 
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other hostile intelligence services, ‘a clearer idea of our functions and methods than 
they have hitherto had.’99 Hollis was right, the book did give a good account of the 
history of the British Security Service from its establishment in 1909 through to the 
early months of the Second World War. In particular, it describes the work and some 
of the methods as practised by Kell, using elucidatory espionage cases, largely 
German, with which the Service had dealt with and defeated. 
 
Of course, the book is not without faults. As Peter Gill has pointed out, M.I.5. 
is based on the private papers of Kell; thus, the tone the book takes is rather uncritical 
towards Britain’s longest serving security service chief.100 Moreover, as Kell was 
dismissed by Winston Churchill in 1940, the book is not as strong in the post-war 
period as it is on the origins of MI5, the First World War and the Interwar period. For 
the post war period, the book is mostly based on secondary sources, which were 
emerging at the time, and elite interviews conducted by Bulloch. The strength of the 
book is its coverage of the period 1919-40; however, reviewers have tended to judge 
the title wholly on the second half and overall given the book a negative review. For 
example, George Constantinides in his Analytical Bibliography of Intelligence and 
Espionage noted the book ‘can in no way be considered even to begin to deal with the 
history of the organisation.’101 Sadly, both Spy Ring and M.I.5, along with his third 
book Akin to Treason, have almost been entirely ignored by contemporary 
intelligence historians, and lie discarded onto the scrap heap of history.  
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Conclusion  
West, Brook-Shepherd and Bulloch are but three pioneers of the Muckraker Era.  
Their most important contribution was methodology, deploying archival intelligence 
hacking, elite interviews and circuitous access to produce robust results. Moreover, 
empirically, in various sub-sets of intelligence history, books from this ostracised era 
contain unique information, for example on the Rezun case. These books can act as 
useful guides to recently declassified files, contributing to more academically rigorous 
texts on intelligence in the twenty-first century. Thus, all that is left from D.C. Watts 
‘in part psychological, in part methodological’ explanation of why literature from the 
Muckraker Era has been marginalised is reputational panic about footnoting books 
that were not produced with the precincts of universities. We therefore need to 
suggest a new way of engaging with literature from the Muckraker Era that respects 
the value of their methodological contribution. 102  
 
Historians who deal with civilisations with limited archival records, for 
instance, historians of the Roman Republic, confront the same methodological issues 
identified in Andrew’s Missing Dimension. Indeed, they are faced with an even more 
daunting ‘missing dimension’, as they are not dealing with gaps in the archives but 
near non-existent archives, as well as limited secondary sources often making 
implausible claims. Nevertheless, with developments in technology combined with 
more sophisticated archaeology, lofty claims by Rome’s official historians can be 
either verified or refuted. Intelligence studies is not dissimilar, and like ancient or 
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medieval history, it will have to develop elaborate skill sets to verify elusive 
information, and as a result grow in stature.  
 
In recent articles on intelligence studies, three pre-eminent scholars in the field 
– Wesley K. Wark, Len Scott and Christopher Moran – have converged along similar 
lines.103  They have all argued that, once marginalised and neglected in academia, the 
subject of intelligence history is now firmly entrenched in British universities. 
Looking at the state of intelligence studies in the UK, their assessment appears on the 
mark. The discipline is growing, despite its epistemological hurdles, and it is also 
becoming ever more popular because of its obvious policy relevance.104  Anthony 
Glees, while arguing that ‘Intelligence Studies is undervalued by universities – with 
only a few institutions offering degrees in intelligence studies, whether at 
undergraduate or postgraduate level’, has conceded that ‘very many universities offer 
modules on intelligence studies’. 105  Moreover, Glees acknowledges that the 
possibilities for the academic study of intelligence in the UK are now ‘immeasurably 
greater’ than at any other point in the past.106 
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Intelligence studies arrived as an academic discipline in the 1980s. As one 
historian of Soviet moles has observed, at this point Christopher Andrew coined the 
phrase, 'the airport bookstall school of intelligence history', and staked out the moral 
high ground to promote archival research.107 It is entirely understandable that a new 
subject felt it necessary to establish its credentials and prove its methodological bona 
fides. But it is unfortunate that it achieved this by vilifying some of its most important 
pioneers, intrepid investigators who piloted so many of the methods and techniques 
that academic intelligence historians would rediscover in the 1980s. Donald Cameron 
Watt’s determination to place these intrepid investigators alongside conspiracy 
theorists is especially regrettable.  
 
Happily, the historiography of intelligence is filled with irony and not a little 
humour. As the late Keith Jeffery acutely observed, since Andrew and Cameron Watt 
criticised the airport bookstall, some of the traffic has been in the other direction. 
Academic historians have not always chosen to publish their findings with an obscure 
academic journal or a lofty university press, and instead have hankered after wider 
public recognition. Jeffery noted that increasingly, sober well-researched work has 
nevertheless been 'subject to sensationalisation'. Discussing recent work on the First 
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World War, he complained that scholars were being encouraged to over-dramatise 
their findings ‘by publishers questing after station (or airport) bookstall sales.'108 
 Having vilified the airport bookstall, has Andrew now embraced it? 
Intriguingly, while most official histories, including that of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee by Michael Goodman, have been required to appear in somnolent 
academic series with Routledge, the official histories MI5 and MI6 were exempted in 
the hope that they would reach the airport bookstall - which indeed they have done in 
full measure. Jeffery himself complained privately of having to resist pressure from 
his publisher to 'sex up' sections of his MI6 history that his editor deemed ‘too 
academic’.109 Yet we should surely celebrate the fact that the official histories of MI5 
and MI6, funded by the public purse, are widely available to non-specialists on the 
airport bookstall, and indeed the railway bookstall, at low cost. Perhaps, as a result, 
the muckraker pioneers have finally been vindicated.  
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